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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STANDING AND
INTERVENTION: THE TENTH CIRCUIT ANSWERS BY
"STANDING" DOWN
San Juan County v. UnitedStates'
I. INTRODUCTION
Under both the standing doctrine and Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP"), a litigant must possess an interest in
the subject matter of the action.2 The relationship between these dual
"interest" requirements has received minimal consideration by the
Supreme Court,3 and the lack of guidance on the matter has led to
contrasting approaches among the circuit courts on what is necessary to
meet the mandates of each.4 In San Juan County v. United States, the
Tenth Circuit addressed the issue for the first time,5 and ultimately held
that a party seeking to intervene need not establish its own standing to sue
or defend in addition to meeting the requirements of FRCP 24(a)(2). 6
Besides providing the Tenth Circuit with precedent on the matter, a
notable contribution of the case may be to demonstrate that the standingintervention question likely has limited value in determining whether a
circuit will allow a party to intervene.

' 420 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2005).
1203.
'Id. at 1204.
4Id. The Seventh, Eighth and D.C. Circuits have held that an "intervenor must establish
its own standing in addition to meeting FRCP 24(a)'s interest requirement prior to
intervening." Id. The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have come to the
opposite conclusion, and they have all held "that a party trying to intervene need only
meet the Rule 24(a) interest requirement." Id.
s Id. at 1203.
6
1d. at 1206. This holding is narrowed in practice due to the Supreme Court's decision in
Diamondv. Charles. In Diamond,the Court did not explicitly address the issue in San
Juan County, but it did hold that in order for an intervening party to appeal, there must be
a party on its side of the action with standing. Id. at 1205-06.
2 Id. at
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
San Juan County ("San Juan") brought a quiet title action against
the United States, the Department of the Interior, and the National Park
Service (collectively "federal defendants").7 San Juan claimed a highway
right-of-way pursuant to Section 8 of the Mining Act of 1866, codified at
43 U.S.C. § 932.8 The alleged right-of-way lies largely in the bed of Salt
Creek,9 located within Canyonlands National Park.' 0 Three wildlife
conservation groups (collectively "SUWA") sought intervention on behalf
of the federal defendants," both permissively and as a matter of right,
7Id. at

1203. The action was brought in accordance with the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. §
2409a (2000).
8San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1201. The Section "was enacted by Congress .. . to assist
in the development of the West by granting rights of way for construction of highways
over public lands to miners, farmers, ranchers, and homesteaders." Id. The "right-ofway could be obtained without application to or approval by the federal government." Id.
Congress repealed Section 932 in 1976 with one caveat, it protected the rights-of-way in
existence at the time of repeal. Id. at 1202. San Juan asserts that its right-of-way, known
as the Salt Creek Road, was used for decades prior to the federal government's
reservation of the lands to create Canyonlands National Park. Id.
9 Opening Brief for Appellant SUWA at 2, San Juan County v. UnitedStates, 420 F.3d
1197 (10th Cir. 2005) (No. 04-4260). "[The] Salt Creek Canyon is an unusually
important feature of Canyonlands National Park ... [bjecause of its beauty and
uncommonly lush environment . . . ." Id. at 5. The Salt Creek supports an extensive
riparian area in Canyonlands National Park. Id. at 6. As surface water and riparian
habitats are rare in the arid Canyonlands National Park, it is particularly important to
those species requiring such habitat. Id. at 6-7. Salt Creek and the Canyon also contain
"the highest recorded density of archeological sites in the National Park. Id. at 8. The
right-of-way claimed by San Juan is for all practical purposes the Salt Creek itself. Id.
Due to the narrowness and ruggedness of the Canyon, a rerouting of the road is
impossible. Id.
toId. at 1202. Canyonlands National Park was created by Congress in 1964 and
"comprises one of the largest expanses of rough, scenic, redrock country in the
southwestern United States." Opening Brief for Appellant SUWA at 6, San Juan County
(No. 04-4260). A peripheral issue was San Juan's seeking of a declaratory judgment that
the National Park Service ("NPS") cannot use a gate to impede its alleged right-of-way.
" The conservation groups were the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, the Wilderness
Society, and the Grand Canyon Trust. Id. The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance is an
environmental group which aims to build strong and lasting support for wilderness
preservation. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance Homepage, http://www.suwa.org. A
large portion of its recent work has involved attempts to stop the State of Utah from
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under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 24.12 The sole purpose
for the intervention by SUWA was to oppose recognition of the right-ofattaining motor vehicle right-of-ways under the Mining Act of 1866. Id.; see also San

Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1201; and infra note 13 with accompanying text. The
Wilderness Society is an environmental group created in 1935 by Aldo Leopold, a
wildlife ecologist at the University of Wisconsin. The Wilderness Society Homepage,
http://www.wildemess.org. The group's mission is the following: "Deliver to future
generations an unspoiled legacy of wild places, with all the precious values they hold:
Biological diversity; clean air and water; towering forests, rushing rivers, and sage-sweet,
silent deserts." Id. The groups crowning achievement is the instrumental role it played
in the passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act. Id. The Grand Canyon Trust classifies itself
as a regional [the greater Grand Canyon region of northern Arizona and in the red rock
country of southern Utah] conservation organization that advocates "common sense
solutions to the significant problems affecting the region's natural resources." The Grand
Canyon Trust Homepage, http://www.grandcanyontrust.org. Its current work is focused
in eight categories: air quality and energy; forests; landscape protection; restoration;
water; volunteer; spatial analysis and Native America. Id.
12 1d. These parties have been involved with ongoing litigation concerning Salt Creek
Canyon since 1992. Opening Brief for Appellant SUWA at 8-9, San Juan County (No.
04-4260). In the 1990s, the NPS prepared a management plan for Canyonlands National
Park to address increased visitor impact on the Park. During the "plan" process, and in
accordance with administrative procedural requirements, SUWA submitted comments to
the NPS urging it to close Salt Creek Road to all motorized traffic. When the NPS
instead chose to implement a permit system that would minimize, but not eliminate,
motorized traffic on Salt Creek Road, SUWA sued the NPS. The federal district court
held that the NPS could not permit motorized vehicles in Salt Creek Canyon past a
specific point, but the Tenth Circuit reversed this determination, holding that the district
court used an improper legal standard in reaching its conclusion and remanded the case to
the district court. After the district court's initial decision, there was no motorized traffic
in the canyon for several years. As a result, trees and other forms of vegetation were able
to return to the vehicle tracks. In response to this ecological rebirth, the NPS prepared an
environmental assessment to determine the efficacy of allowing motorized traffic in Salt
Creek Canyon. In a shift of opinion, the NPS sided with SUWA and closed Salt Creek
Canyon above Peekaboo campsite to all motorized traffic, erecting a gate to accomplish
the closure. In the intervening time, the federal district court, now determining the action
remanded by the Tenth Circuit, permitted SUWA to amend its complaint against the NPS
to include San Juan County and the State of Utah as defendants. When San Juan County
and the state of Utah filed a motion for partial summary judgment based upon a 43
U.S.C. § 932 right-of-way argument, the district court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to grant the partial summary judgment those parties sought, because they had
never adequately pled a claim under the federal Quiet Title Act, and dismissed them from
the case. The current action ensued. San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1201-03.
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way in Salt Creek Canyon.13 Prior to the instant decision, SUWA
participated in extensive litigation concerning the scope of motorized
traffic allowed on the right-of-way.14 San Juan and the federal defendants
each opposed the intervention,' 5 claiming that without an ownership
interest in Salt Creek, SUWA did not satisfy the language of FRCP 24,16
specifically the requirement under FRCP 24(a)(2) that the party attempting
to intervene "have an interest relating to property that is the subject matter
of the action."l 7 Believing the past protectionist involvement with Salt
Creek Canyon was not controlling,' 8 the district court denied the request to
intervene,1 9 and as a decision denying intervention is immediately
appealable,2 0 SUWA appealed. 2 '
On appeal, San Juan argued that SUWA must first establish
standing before intervening under FRCP 24.22 After recognizing that the
standing/intervention argument "raise[d] a question of first impression in
this circuit,"2 3 the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's decision.24
The court held that a party seekin to intervene under FRCP 24, as either a
matter of right or permissively, 5 is not required to establish its own
Article III standing in addition to meeting the requirements of FRCP 24.26

'3

Opening Brief for Appellant SUWA at 3, San Juan County (No. 04-4260).

4 San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1202. For an extensive description
of the earlier

litigation
see supra note 13.
15

id.

16 Opening

Brief for Appellant SUWA at 3, San Juan County (No. 04-4260).

I17
id.

Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1202.
I9Id.
20
Id.An order denying intervention is final and subject to immediate review
if it
prevents the applicant from becoming a party to an action. See Utah Ass'n of Counties v.
Clinton, 225 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001).
21 San Juan County, 420 F.3d
at 1202.
22 Id. at 1203.
23 Id.
24
Id. at 1206.
18San

25
26

Id. This is the case "so long as another party with constitutional standing on the same
side as the intervenor remains in the case." Id.
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Standing Doctrine
Under Article III of the United States Constitution, federal judicial
power is limited to deciding "cases" and "controversies."27 The standing
doctrine "is an aspect of the case-or-controversy requirement,"28 the basis
of which is to prevent the issuance of advisory opinions.29 To qualify as a
party with standing to litigate, a party must demonstrate an invasion of a
legally protected interest that is concrete, particularized, and actual or
imminent.3 0 Standing is often referred to as a confused area of the law by
courts and commentators, 3 1 and the criteria for standing is by no means
static.32 Furthermore, because standing directly implicates a federal court's
subject matter jurisdiction, 33 it must be established prior to addressing the
merits of a case.34
There are a number of policy reasons for the creation and
continued existence of the standing doctrine. 35 First, the doctrine promotes
separation of powers by preventing courts from exercising a pervasive
form of judicial review. 36 For example, through standing restrictions on
Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 61 (1986).
Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997).
29
ERWIN CHERMINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 53-54 (2d ed.
2002). The justifications for prohibiting advisory opinions include: maintaining
separation of powers by only resolving actual disputes between parties, the conservation
ofjudicial resources that could be unwisely expended "advising" on legislation that
would ultimately not garner approval, and to "ensure that cases will be presented to the
Court in terms of specific disputes, not hypothetical legal questions." Id.
30
Arizonansfor Official English, 520 U.S. at 64.
27

28

31 See generally JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 1 (1978); see also Valley Forge

Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464,
475 (1982) ("[T]he concept of Art. III standing has not been defined with complete
consistency .... ).
32 Valley Forge ChristianColl., 454 U.S. at 475.
3 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180 (2000).
34 id.

3 CHERMINSKY, supra note 30, at 61-62.
3 See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrineof Standing as an EssentialElement of the
SeparationofPowers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REv. 881 (1983); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811,
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who may sue in federal courts, the doctrine limits judicial review of the
actions of the other branches of government rather than allow federal
courts unfettered discretion concerning what cases they will decide. 37
Secondly, standing may facilitate judicial efficiency by preventing those
who do not meet the requirements from filing lawsuits based in large part
on ideological grounds.3 8 If the federal courts were burdened by
ideological suits, their resources would not be properly focused on cases
where the legal issues are clear and the dispute is ripe for resolution. 39
Third, and directly related to the negative effects that could arise if
ideological litigation was permitted,4 0 standing ensures "that there is a
specific controversy before the court [so] an advocate with a sufficient
personal concern [will] litigate the matter."41 The rationale is that when a
party has a particularized personal interest in the outcome of a case, it will
do all that is possible to be victorious.4 2 This will, in theory, lead to a more
coherent and well-reasoned presentation of the legal issues. 43 Finally, if
the standing doctrine did not exist, the Supreme Court has recognized the
possibility that litigious intermeddlers could assert the rights of others to
provide protection that the latter do not desire. 44 Therefore, standing
mandates that individuals assert their own rights by bringing a
personalized claim, 4 5 "[a]n interest shared generally with the public at
large ... will not do."

819 (1997); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984); and Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975).
3 See supra notes 32 and 37.
38 CHERMINSKY, supra note 30, at 61.
39
Id. at 61 nn.10-11 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring); and United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90-91
(1947)).
4 See supra note 37.
41 CHERMINSKY,
42

supra note 30, at 61.

Id. (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
43 See generally Baker, 369 U.S. at 204.
4 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-114 (1976).
45 CHERMINSKY, supra note 30, at 62.
46 Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43, 64 (1997).
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B. Intervention: History andpolicy
As a general matter, individuals not parties to a suit are unable to
47
participate in or control the proceedings of the suit. Through the
procedural device of intervention,4 8 a party may be granted party status to
an existing suit and will have the ability to participate fully. " Intervention
recognizes that parties who were not original parties to the litigation may
nonetheless "have an interest in entering . . . if the outcome will have an

effect on them." 50 There are a number of competing "interests"
Brian Hutchings, Waitingfor DivineIntervention: The Fifth Circuit Tries to Give
Meaning to Intervention Rules in Sierra Club v. City of San Antonio, 43 VILL. L. REv.
693,699 (1998).
48 Intervention has its roots in equity and admiralty practice. Peter A. Appel, Intervention
in PublicLaw Litigation: The EnvironmentalParadigm,78 WASH. U. L. Q. 215, 240
(2000). In addition, intervention has been characterized by commentators as "a relatively
recent development in the law." Hutchings, supra note 48, at 702, 702 n.31
("Intervention ... is a comparatively recent innovation in Anglo-American legal
procedure. It was a familiar device in the Roman law and thus in the civil law generally
and there had been rudimentary procedures of this kind available in admiralty, and
occasionally at common law and equity, but these were not well developed nor of very
47

general applicability") (citing 7C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE § 1901 (2d ed. 1986)); see also James W. Moore & Edward H. Levi,
FederalIntervention: I. The Right to Intervene and Reorganization,45 YALE L.J. 565,
568-74 (1936)).
49 Hutchings, supra note 48, at 699.
50
Id. at 700. A thoughtful law review article provides excellent commentary on a
situation where intervention may be used:
In the standard private lawsuit, A v. B, the procedural device of
intervention falls within the larger context of multiparty practice, that
is, how and under what circumstances outsiders are added to the
original litigation. Thus, if A sues B to require B to repay a debt to A,
and C claims an interest in the transaction - for example, C claims that
B owes C money as well, and paying A will interfere with C collecting
from B - various devices can be used to involve C in the litigation ....
If C believes that the two original parties have colluded or will
otherwise dispose of C's interest without C's involvement - for
example, if A sues B for repayment on the debt, and B is in collusion
with A and knows that A will not enforce the judgment - then C may
get involved through the device of intervention to protect C's interest. .
Appel, supra note 49, at 239-40.
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intervention attempts to balance and provide with representation. 5 ' These
include the original parties' interest in controlling the litigation, 52 the
court's interest in reaching the best possible decision, which may be
facilitated by an intervenor's expertise, 53 and the court's interest in
efficiently resolving disputes. 54
Since its codification in 1937,ss FRCP 24 has consisted of two
types of intervention, intervention of right and permissive intervention. 6
Intervention of right is granted once the party attempting to intervene
meets the requirements set forth in FRCP 24(a),s? when a statute grants an

"52 Hutchings,
Id. at 700.

supra note 49, at 699-701.

53 id.

54

Id. at 700-01.
" Id. at 703.
s6 Id. The 1937 version of Rule 24 read, as to intervention of right:
(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the representation of the
applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be inadequate and the
applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action; or (3) when
the applicant is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution
or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24 (1937).
57
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a) (2005) (granting right to intervene). The current version of Rule
24 states (in relevant part):
(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in
an action:
(1) when a statute of the United States confers an
unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an
interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the
action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties.
(b) Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an
action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers a conditional
right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the
main action have a question of law or fact in common. When a party to
an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer
or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement
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unconditional right to intervene or an applicant has an interest in the
litigation that is not adequately represented by the parties and it could be
impaired by the outcome of the action.58 When these requirements are
met, a court must grant the intervention.5 9
With permissive intervention,6 0 intervention is granted at the
court's discretion and "can be allowed when there is a common question o
law orfact between the litigation and the applicant's claim or defense."
Thus, a party seeking to intervene can eliminate the court's discretionary
power under FRCP 24(b) 62 by placing itself within the plain language of
FRCP 24(a). 63 It is for this reason that the majority of case law and
commentary on Rule 24 has focused on intervention of right. 4
issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or
agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the
action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties.
Id. at 24(a)-(b). The Tenth Circuit only addressed the issue of permissive intervention in
passing, so this Note will only do so as well. San Juan County v. U.S., 420 F.3d 1197,
1206 (10th Cir. 2005). Specifically, the court's extent of coverage was its statement that
"[f]or the same reasons relied upon above [its logic regarding intervention as of right], we
also conclude that a party seeking to intervene permissively need not first establish its
standing." Id.
58
Hutchings, supranote 48, at 703-704 (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 24(a) (2005)).
59 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). For the relevant text of FED. R. CIV. P. 24, see supranote 58.
60 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b). While the court in San Juan County did not find the need to
analyze the claim of SUWA under permissive intervention, a brief overview of it is
provided in order to place intervention of right in the context of an aggregate FED. R. CIV.
P. 24.
61Hutchings, supranote 48, at 703-704 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b)) (emphasis
added).
62
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
63 FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).

6 See generally Appel, supra note 49; Ellyn J. Bullock, Acid Rain Fallson the Just and
the Unjust: Why Standing's CriteriaShould Not Be IncorporatedInto Intervention of
Right, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 605 (1990); Rodrick J. Coffey, Giving a Hoot About an Owl
Does Not Satisfy the Interest Requirementfor Intervention: The Misapplicationof
Intervention as of Right in Coalition of Arizona/New Mexico Counties for Stable
Economic Growth v. Department of the Interior, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811 (1998);
Hutchings, supra note 48; Juliet Johnson Karastelev, On the OutsideSeeking In: Must
Intervenors DemonstrateStanding to Join A Lawsuit, 52 DuKE L.J. 455 (2002); Tyler R.
Stradling & Doyle S. Byers, Intervening in the Case (orControversy): Article III
Standing,Rule 24 Intervention, and the Conflict in the FederalCourts, 2003 B.Y.U. L.
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C. Intervention: Interpretationand changes to the rule
Due to the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of FRCP 24
in Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 5 the Rule was amended in
1966 to increase the availability of intervention to those wishing to
67 the Court,
participate in pending litigation.66 In Sam Fox Publishing,
citing the language of FRCP 24,68 held that applicants for intervention of
right must show that they will be legally bound by a judgment before
intervening under Rule 24(a)(2).6 9 Specifically, the applicant must satisfy
the requirement that the party "is or may be bound by a judgment in the
action"70 in addition to showing that their interests may be inadequately
represented or that they would be adversely affected by a disposition of
property in the custody of the court. 7 When the "bound" language was
read literally in terms of res judicata,72 it appeared to eliminate the
possibility of parties intervening as of right. For example, if an applicant
sought to intervene based on inadequacy of representation, they were no
longer "bound" by the judgment for purposes of res judicata, but if the
REv. 419 (2003); and San Juan County, 420 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2005). But see Amy M.

Gardner, An Attempt to Intervene in the Confusion: Standing Requirementsfor Rule 24
Intervenors, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (2002).
65 Appel, supra note 49, at 240 (citing Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States, 366 U.S.
683 (1961)).
66 Hutchings, supra note 48, at 707-709. Prior to the 1966 amendments, Rule 24 was also
amended in 1946, 1948, and 1963, but these amendments lacked the long-term
significance of those in 1966. FED. R. CIV. P. 24, advisory committee notes.
67 366 U.S. 683 (1961).
68
69

Id. at 694.

Id. (holding that showing by applicant that it will be legally bound by court's decision
"is what must be made out before a party may intervene as of right").
7o FED. R. CIv. P. 24, 1966 advisory committee note.
71See FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a) (1937).
72 Res judicata is defined as: 1. An issue that has been definitively settled
by judicial
decision. 2. An affirmative defense barring the same parties from litigating a second
lawsuit of the same claim. The three essential elements are (1) an earlier decision on the
identical issue, (2) a final judgment on the merits, and (3) the involvement of the same
parties or parties in privity with the original parties. A HANDBOOK OF BASIC LAW TERMS
189-90 (Bryan A. Garner ed., West Group 1999).
7 See FED. R. CIV. P. 24, 1966 advisory committee note; and Hutchings, supra note 48, at
706.
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representation was adequate, the applicant no longer met the requirements
of FRCP 24(a)(2).74
The 1966 amendment replaced the "bound" language with the
current four-prong test. 75 Currently, applicants can intervene if: (1) the
application was timely; (2) the applicant "claims an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action;" (3) the
disposition of the action may impair or impede the ability to protect that
interest; and (4) the applicant is not adequately represented by existing
parties.7 6 The second prong of the test has received a great deal of judicial
attention, and what constitutes a sufficient "interest" is often the central
issue in cases concerning FRCP 24.
D. A lack of clarity defining "interest"
Although courts have repeatedly dealt with the "interest" issue, 7 8
there is no agreement on what type of interest is required to satisfy the
requirements of FRCP 24.79 However, a number of Supreme Court cases
provide limited guidance on the matter.
In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,80 the
Supreme Court applied the amended Rule 24 to an antitrust case appealed
directly to the Court under the Expediting Act.8 1 The case involved a
merger of two natural gas companies the Court found to be in violation of
the Clayton Act. 82 After the Court remanded the case to the district court
for divestiture,8 3 three parties sought to intervene.84 The district court
74

FED. R. Civ. P. 24, 1966 advisory committee note.

Hutchings, supra note 48, at 707.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
7 Hutchings, supra note 48, at 708-710. This is in large part due to the lack of Supreme
Court precedent on the issue. See supra notes 4 and 7 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 4 and 7 and accompanying text.
79
See supra notes 4 and 7 and accompanying text.
8o 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
81 Id. at 131-34.
82
Id. See also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (this was
the case name the first time the parties reached the Supreme Court).
" El PasoNatural Gas Co., 376 U.S. at 662. The Court held that the acquisition of
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation by El Paso Natural Gas Company violated § 7 of
the Clayton Act and directed the district court "to order divestiture without delay." Id.
7s
76
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denied intervention to the parties,8 5 but the Supreme Court permitted
intervention under a broad interpretation of "interest" and "transaction
which is the subject of the action."86
The broad interpretation enunciated in Cascade was narrowed in
Donaldson v. United States.87 In Donaldson, an individual being
investigated by the IRS attempted to intervene in the IRS's action to
compel his former employer to provide the agency with his employment
records.88 Donaldson believed that government agents were improperly
using a section of the Internal Revenue Code89 "for the express and sole
purpose of obtaining [criminal] evidence."90 As the objective of this
statutory scheme was to ascertain the correctness of a return, 9 ' using it as a
pretext to gather criminal evidence was alleged to be impermissible. 92 The
Supreme Court found that Donaldson did not have a sufficient interest in
the subject of the litigation, 93 and held that a "significantly protectable
The primary rationale of the divestiture was to restore the competitive market that was
undermined by the illegal acquisition. Cascade,386 U.S. at 135 ("For it was the
absorption of Pacific Northwest by El Paso that stifled that competition and
disadvantaged the California interests").
84 Cascade,386 U.S. at 132-33. The three parties were: the State of California, Southern
California Edison, and Cascade Natural Gas. Id. California was where El Paso sold most
of its gas and its purpose for intervening was to see Pacific Northwest restored as an
effective competitor in California. Id. at 132. Southern California Edison was a large
industrial user of natural gas that purchased from El Paso components and it also desired
retaining the competitive atmosphere in California. Id. at 132-33. Cascade Natural Gas
was a distributor in Oregon and Washington whose sole supplier of natural gas was
Pacific Northwest. Id. at 133.
85 Id. at 136 ("We therefore reverse the District Court in each of these appeals and
remand with directions to allow each appellant to intervene as of right. . . .").
86
Id. at 135. The Court chose to apply the new version of FED. R. Civ. P. 24 because the
"Rule applies to 'further proceedings' in pending actions." Id. at 135-36. This choice
was an issue of contention between the majority and dissent. Id. at 153.
"8 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
Id. at 518-521.
89 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1954).
90
Donaldson,400 U.S. at 521.
9 Id. at 519.
9

Id. at 521.
The court noted that what was sought here by the IRS was the production of an
employer's records and not the records of the taxpayer. Id. at 522-23. The summonses
issued were directed to a third person with no established legal privilege (i.e. attorney and
9
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interest" was necessary to meet the interest requirement under FRCP
24(a)(2). 94
Further discussion on FRCP 24 was provided in Trbovich v. United
Mine Workers of America.9 5 The decision, based on Title IV of the LaborManagement Reporting and Disclosure Act,9 6 did not specifically involve
the "interest" criteria, but it "seemed to imply that an applicant does not
need to show standing to sue" in order to intervene. 97 That said, Trbovich
"has been cited by courts both finding and denying standing for
intervenors."98 The most significant impact Trbovich has had so far is
through its statement in a footnote that the burden of showing inadequacy
of representation "should be treated as minimal." 99
The standing-intervention question was discussed by the Court in
Diamondv. Charles,00 but it refused to resolve the issue.' 0 ' In Diamond, a
group of physicians filed a class action suit challenging the
constitutionality of an Illinois abortion law.' 02 Diamond, a pediatrician,
filed a motion to intervene as a defendant, asserting that his interest was
his objection to abortions as well as his status as both a pediatrician and a
parent of a minor daughter. 0 3 After the district court ordered a preliminary
client), and "had to do with records in which the taxpayer has no proprietary interest of
any kind, which are owned by the third person, which are in his hands, and which relate
to the third person's business transactions with the taxpayer." Id. at 523.
94
Id. at 531. Only minimal elaboration on "significantly protectable interest" was
provided ("Donaldson's only interest - and of course it looms large in his eyes - lies in
the fact that those records presumably contain details of Acme-to-Donaldson payments
possessing significance for federal income tax purposes. This asserted interest, however,
is nothing more than a desire by Donaldson to counter and overcome [the third parties'
willingness to produce the records]"). Id. at 530-31.

s 404 U.S. 528 (1972).
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (2000).
97
Hutchings, supra note 48, at 712.
96

98 Gardner, supra note 65, at 692.

9 Trbovich v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.10 (1972) ("The
requirement of the Rule is satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his
interest 'may be' inadequate; and the burden of making that showing should be treated as
minimal").
10 Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
'otId. at 68-69.
102

Id. at 57-58.

103 id.
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injunction against enforcement of the law, only Diamond appealed.104 As a
result, the issue for the Court to address was narrowed to what interest is
necessary to appeal. 0 5 The Court held that if an intervenor wishes to
appeal a judgment alone, the party must show that it "fulfills the
requirements of Art. III.",106 Consequently, the standing-intervention issue
remains relatively unanswered, allowing the circuit split to persist.
E. The CircuitSplit
The Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits have held that an
intervenor must meet the requirements of both FRCP 24(a)(2) and
standing in order to intervene of right.' 0 7
In an action brought by the Army Corps of Engineers to prevent
the construction of a landfill,os the Seventh Circuit discussed "the
minimal standing required by Article III, which [the] court requires of any
intervenor."' 09 It considered the possibility that the "interest" requirement
in FRCP 24(a)(2) could be less than that of standing,1o but concluded that
standing is required."' Resolving the case on a different component of
FRCP 24(a)(2),ll2 the court found that the interests of the original party
and those of the potential intervenors were identical.1 3 Therefore,
intervention of right was denied.1 4 Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit
vacated the denial of permissive intervention and remanded the case to the
district court for reconsideration of the issue."t 5

104Id.

"s Id. at 68.
106

d

San Juan County v. U.S., 420 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005).
108 Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 101 F.3d 503, 507 (7th
Cir. 1996).
109
Id. (citing United States v. 36.96 Acres, 754 F.2d 855, 859 (7th Cir. 1985)).
107

" 0 Id. at 506.
11 Id.

112 Id. at 508.
113

Id.

114 Id. at 508-09.

' Id. at 509.
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In South Dakota v. Ubbelohde,"6 the Eighth Circuit addressed the
standing-interest question in a case arising out of the apportionment of
water from the Missouri River." 7 The court, without providing a policy
rationale or citing to other case law," 8 explicitly held that "[a] party
seeking to intervene must establish both that it has standing to complain
and that the elements of Rule 24(a)(2) are met."'" This holding did not
prevent the court from permitting petitioners to intervene, finding that
each of the intervenors satisfied its enunciated standard.120
The D.C. Circuit has held that "because a Rule 24 intervenor seeks
to participate on an equal footing with the original parties to the suit, he
[sic] must satisfy the standing requirements imposed on those parties."l21
Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton dealt with the application of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA")122 to argali sheep located within
Mongolia's borders.123 Fund for Animals, along with various other
wildlife conservation groups, filed suit against the Secretary of the Interior
and the Director of the Fish and Wildlife Service due to their failure to
classify the argali sheep as endangered, 124 as opposed to threatened.12 5 The
D.C. Circuit ultimately found that the country of Mongolia, through its
Natural Resources Department, was entitled to intervention of right.126
The court first analyzed the standing component' 27 and noted that once a

330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003).
" Id. at 1019-22.

116

"s Id. at 1023-24.

"'9 Id. at 1023.
1201d. at 1023-26.
121 Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing City
of
Cleveland v. NRC, 17 F.3d 1515, 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1994)); see generally Military Toxics
Project v. EPA, 146 F.3d 948 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
122 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
123FundforAnimals, 322 F.3d at 730-3 1.
124 Id. A species is endangered if it "is in danger of extinction throughout all or a
significant portion of its range." Id. at 730.
125 A species is threatened if it "is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable
future." Id.
1
1 Id. at 737-38.
127Id. at 732-34.
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party has satisfied the standing requirements, "the balance of [the] analysis
[is] not difficult at all."1 2 8
The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held
that an intervenor need only meet FRCP 24(a)(2)'s requirements to

intervene of right.129
The Second Circuit has focused on whether there is a "case or
controversy" in the litigation at issue. 130 If so, "there [is] no need to
impose the standing requirement upon the proposed intervenor."' 3 1 At
issue in Brennan was the constitutionality of an action brought by the
Postal Service to prevent the Brennans from running a small mail delivery
business in the downtown Rochester area.1 32 The National Association of
Letter Carriers ("NALC")13 3 sought intervention after previously being
permitted to participate as an amicus. 134 Because the court found that
NALC had standing, but did not satisfy the "inadequacy of representation"
component of FRCP 24(a)(2), it affirmed the district court's order denying

intervention.13 5
In Ruiz v. Estelle,136 the Fifth Circuit allowed two Texas state
legislators to intervene in a suit concerning Texas prison conditions. 37
The court found that the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA")' 3 8 gave
the legislators "an unconditional right to intervene" 39 and thus, the
Id. at 734.
San Juan County v. U.S., 420 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 2005).
130 United States Postal Serv. V. Brennan, 579 F.2d 188, 190-92 (2nd
Cir. 1978).
Id. at 190.
128

129

132

id.

NALC is a national labor union which acts as a bargaining agent for circa 200,000
employees of the Postal Service. Id.
134 id
133

135Id.

136 161 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 1998).
13 1 Id. at 816. The litigation began
13818 U.S.C. § 3626 (2000).
139

more than twenty-five years ago. Id.

Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 816-17. The PLRA states in pertinent part:
Any State or local official including a legislator or unit of government
whose jurisdiction or function includes the appropriation of funds for
the construction, operation, or maintenance of prison facilities, or the
prosecution or custody of persons who may be released from, or not
admitted to, a prison as a results of a prisoner release order shall have
standing to oppose the imposition or continuation in effect of such
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intervention request fell under FRCP 24(a)(1).140 While addressing the
argument that the PLRA unconstitutionally allowed parties without
standing to intervene, 14 1 the court found "better reasoning in those cases
which hold that Article III does not require intervenors to possess
standing."l 42
The Sixth Circuit takes a "rather expansive notion of the interest
sufficient to invoke intervention of right."l 43 According to the court in
UnitedStates v. Tennessee,144 implicit within this broad conception is that
an intervenor need not have the same standing necessary to initiate a
lawsuit.145 Furthermore, the circuit rejected the belief that FRCP 24(a)(2)
requires a specific legal or equitable interest, 146 and determines interest
sufficiency on a fact specific basis.147 The lawsuits underlying Tennessee
were brought by the United States and other plaintiffs against the State of
Tennessee focusing on the operation of its mental health system.148 An
association of nonprofit agencies that provided services to people with
mental disabilities sought intervention of right and was denied by two
district courts.149

relief, and shall have the right to intervene in any proceeding relating
to such relief
18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3)(F) (emphasis added).
14 0
Ruiz, 161 F.3d at 816-17. The court stated that intervention under FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(1) is "absolute and unconditional." Id. at 828.
141Id. at 828-33.
142 Id. at 832. "These cases recognize that the Article III standing doctrine serves
primarily to guarantee the existence of a 'case' or 'controversy' appropriate for judicial
determination, and hold that Article III does not require each and every party in a case to
have such standing." Id.
143United States v. Tenn., 260 F.3d 587, 595 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mich. State AFLCIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1245 (6th Cir. 1997)).
144United States v. Tenn., 260 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001).
45
1 Id. (citing Mich. State AFL-CIO, 103 F.3d at 1245; Purnell v. City of Akron, 925 F.2d

941, 948 (6th Cir. 1991)).
146

Id. at 595.

147 Id.

48
1 Id. at

590-91.

149 Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the decisions of the lower courts, finding that the

association was not timely in bringing its motions and did not establish an adequate
substantial interest in either lawsuit. Id. at 596.
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In Yniguez v. Arizona,1 50 the Ninth Circuit addressed requests to
intervene in an action determining if an amendment to the Arizona
Constitution was in violation of the federal constitution.15 1 The substantive
effect of the amendment was to declare that English was the official
language of the State of Arizona.152 The appellate court affirmed the
denial of the Arizona Attorney General's request to intervene,15 3 but
reversed the intervention denial of Arizonans for Official English
("AOE") and its spokesman.' 54 The court cited Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc.
v. Watt'55 for the proposition that in order for an individual to intervene in
ongoing litigation, he or she need only meet the plain language of FRCP
24(a)(2).156 However, in order for the intervenor to be the sole party on
appeal, it must have standing in accordance with Article 111.157
The Eleventh Circuit has analyzed the intervention-standing issue
in a manner similar to that of the Ninth Circuit.'5 Dillard v. Baldwin
County Commissioners was based on alleged violations of the Voting
Rights Act 59 through inadequate representation of African-American
voters on an Alabama county commission.160 After remedial action was
taken by a federal district court, three individuals sought to intervene as
plaintiffs to oppose the remedial action.' 6 ' Prior to finding that the facts
alleged were sufficient to allow the claim of the potential intervenors' to
survive a motion to dismiss,' 62 the court went through an analysis of the
so 939 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1991).
' Id. at 729.
152 id.
3

Id. at 738-40 ("Only after the district court granted the Attorney General's request and
then reached a result on the merits with which the Attorney General disagreed did that
official decide that he would rather be a party after all. We will not accept such a
reversal in position"). Id. at 738.
54
1 Id. at 730-38.
1 Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
156 Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 731 (citing SagebrushRebellion, 713 F.2d at 527).
57
Id. (citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986)). This was under the logic that if
at least one party on both sides of the litigation does not have standing, the jurisdictional
prerequisite of a live "case" or "controversy" was not met. Id.
1Dillard v. Baldwin County Comm'rs, 225 F.3d 1271, 1277-78 (1Ith Cir. 2000).
i' See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2000).
'60 Dillard,225 F.3d at 1273.
16 1Id.
1s

162

Id. at 1280-83.
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court's past holdings concerning intervention and standing.163 In summary,
the court found that "a party seeking to intervene need not demonstrate
standing in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 24 as long as
there exists a justiciable case and controversy between the parties already
in the lawsuit."1

IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority explicitly noted that "San Juan's standing argument
raises a question of first impression ... and an issue on which the circuits
are divided."l 65 In holding that a party seeking to intervene need not
demonstrate Article III standing in addition to meeting the requirements of
FRCP Rule 24(a)(2), the court concluded that this approach "is the better
reasoned."l 66 Recognizing that the Supreme Court "has not specifically

Id. at 1277-80.
' Id. at 1277-78 (citing Chiles v. Thornburgh, 865 F.2d 1197, 1213 (11th Cir. 1989)).
165 San Juan County v. U.S., 420 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2005). The split among the
circuits is due in large part to the failure of the Supreme Court to definitively address the
issue in Diamondv. Charles. In addition to the Tenth Circuit in this case, "the Second,
Fifth, Sixth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have all held that an intervenor need only meet
Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirement that the intervenor have an interest in the litigation." Id. at
1204. "The Seventh, Eighth and D.C. Circuits have held that an intervenor must establish
its own standing, in addition to meeting Rule 24(a)(2)'s interest requirement, before
intervening." Id.
'6 Id. at 1205. "To qualify as a party with standing to litigate, a person must show, first
and foremost, an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized
and actual or imminent." Arizonians for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64
(1997). "Rule 24(a)(2), on the other hand, provides that: upon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action when the applicant claims an interest relating
to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so
situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately
represented by existing parties." San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1204 (citing FED. R. Civ.
P. 24(a)(2) (2005)).
163

64
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resolved the issue,"167 the majority implicitly asserted that the Court
would agree with its holding.168
In order to substantiate this claim, the court cited language of the
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Charles,169 that "an intervening
defendant . .. would be entitled to seek review, enabling him to file a brief

on the merits, and to seek leave to argue orally. But this ability to ride
"piggyback" on the [originaldefendant's] undoubted standing exists only
if the [original defendant] is in fact an appellant before the Court."' 7 0 In
other words, the Supreme Court assumes without arguing that a party
could intervene ("piggyback") if another party with Article III standing is
also before the court.' 7 ' It is worth noting that the Diamond decision may
have somewhat limited relevance due to the fact that the intervenor in that
case "was the only party to the litigation pursuing an appeal." 72
The majority held that "a party seeking to intervene under FRCP
24, either as a matter of right or permissively, need not establish its own
standing in addition to meeting Rule 24's requirements, before the party
can intervene so long as another party with constitutional standing on the
same side as the intervenor remains in the case."' 73
After addressing the standing issue, the majority analyzed whether
SUWA met the components of FRCP 24(a)(2).174 The majority
synthesized the rule as such:
an applicant may intervene as of right if:
(1) the
application is timely; (2) the applicant claims an interest
relating to the property or transaction which is the subject
of the action; (3) the applicant's interest may as a practical
167

See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003);
Ingalls Shipbuilding,
Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs, 519 U.S. 248 (1997).
168San Juan County, 420 F.3d
at 1204-05.
169 476 U.S. 54 (1986).
1o San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1205. The Tenth Circuit
cited other Supreme Court
decisions which, although not addressing the issue directly, seemed to assume that the
requirements for intervention are only those explicitly listed in FED. R. Clv. P. 24. Id.
171
See generally Diamond,476 U.S. 54.
17 2 San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1205.
73
' Id. at 1206 (emphasis added).
174 Id. at 1206-13.

228

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STANDING AND INTER VENTION
matter be impaired or impeded; and (4) the applicant's
interest is not adequately represented by existing parties. 7 5
Because the timeliness of SUWA's intervention request was not
disputed, the court "address[ed] only the remaining three parts of the
inquiry."l 76 In its discussion on the second requirement of FRCP 24(a)(2
the court found that the "direct, substantial, and legally protectable"'
interest of SUWA was sufficiently related to the property or transaction at
issue.' The court cited its past decision in Utah Association of Counties
v. Clinton,179 where the court stated that organizations whose purpose is
the protection and conservation of wildlife "have a protectable interest in
litigation that threatens those goals." 8 0 Furthermore, the court found
salient the fact that SUWA had previously been involved with litigation,
planning, and rulemaking focused on Salt Creek Canyon.' 8 ' Finally, the
court dismissed the argument that because SUWA does not assert an
ownership interest in the Salt Creek Canyon, it cannot intervene. 182
Instead, the court held that a "direct user interest in [the] property ... has
always been . .. sufficient to support intervention.' 83

7

Id. at 1207 (citing Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246, 1249 (10th Cir.
2001)).
"76 id.
7 Id.
7
' 1 Id. at 1207-08.
1'

17'255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001).
80

o San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1207.
181Id. at 1207-08.
182Id.

at 1209.

Id.. The court noted that
SUWA's members and staff enjoy hiking, camping, birdwatching,
study, contemplation, solicitude, photography, and other activities on
NPS lands, and particularly on lands in Canyonlands National Park and
Salt Creek Canyon. These health, recreational, scientific spiritual,
educational, aesthetic, informational, and other interests will be directly
affected and harmed by a decision granting San Juan County's R.S.
2477 claim, thereby overturning the NPS's closure order for Salt Creek
Canyon beyond Peekaboo Spring and returning motorized vehicles to
Salt Creek Canyon.
id.at 1207.
183
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The court then found that the interest existing could, as a practical
matter, be impaired or impeded by an adverse decision on San Juan's quiet
title action. 4 Again citing Utah Association of Counties,1s the court
stated that meeting this burden is minimal and a "court is not limited to
consequences of a strictly legal nature."' 86 A San Juan right-of-way would
result in opening the Salt Creek road to motorized traffic,' 87 lessening the
amount of conservatory management options available to the NPS. 88
Even if there are alternative participatory options open to SUWA,1 89 "the
mere availability of alternative forums is not sufficient to justify denial of
a motion to intervene."190
In the final portion of its opinion, the majority tackled the
"minimal burden" of showing that one's interest would not be adequately
represented.191 The court found sufficient the six assertions of inadequacy
put forth by SUWA.1 92 Viewed in the context that the burden of showing
184

Id. at 1211.

1" 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001).

San Juan County, 420 F.3d at 1210.

87

1 Id.
Id. at
"9

190

Id.

1210-11 (i.e. a prohibition on motor vehicle traffic).

at 1211.

d.

191 Id. at

1211-12.
An applicant may fulfill this burden by showing collusion between the
representative and an opposing party, that the representative has an
interest adverse to the applicant, or that the representative failed in
fulfilling his duty to represent the applicant's interest .... However,
representation is adequate when the objective of the applicant for
intervention is identical to that of the parties.
Id. (citing Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Economic Growth, 100 F.3d 837, 84445 (10th Cir. 1996)).
192 The six reasons were: (1) SUWA had to sue the NPS originally to get the NPS to
prohibit all vehicle traffic on the road; (2) SUWA's interst is narrowly focused on
protecting Salt Creek Canyon from the damage and destruction caused by motorized
vehicles; (3) the NPS has never finalized its preliminary administrative finding that San
Juan's R.S. 2477 claim to a right-of-way was not valid; (4) in 2000 and 2001 the NP S
permitted San Juan officials twice to drive in Salt Creek Canyon, despite the NPS's
closure of the canyon to vehicle traffic; (5) the federal defendants oppose SUWA's
intervention, not even recognizing that a conservation interest is implicated in this case;
(6) the federal defendants might decide to settle this quiet title action. San Juan County,
420 F.3d at 1212-13.
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inadequacy is made easier "when the party upon which the intervenor
must rely is the government,"' 93 the court reversed the district court's
decision denying SUWA intervention of right.194
B. The Dissent
Judge Porfilio's dissent first focused on the issue of what
constitutes "an interest relating to the property or transaction" within the
language of FRCP 24(a)(2).' 19 More specifically, he found the words
"property" and "transaction" critical to a proper application of intervention
as a matter of right.19 6 While Porfilio attributed to the majority an
interpretation of these terms rendering them interchangeable, he stated
case law has established that "those words connote dissimilar concepts"
and must be viewed as distinct from one another.' 97
Furthermore, as the complaint is based upon the Quiet Title Act
("QTA"), he asserted that the only purpose of the action is "to adjudicate a
disputed title to real property in which the United States claims an
interest."l 98 Therefore, "it becomes clear that a litigable 'interest' in [this]
action is dependant upon a claim to the land itself."99 Porfilio supports his
argument by citing Kinscherff v. United States, a case he believes
"establishes the boundaries of the interest in land [property] required to
pursue a quiet title action." 200 Although Kinschereff did not deal with
intervention, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
action because plaintiffs' "interest" in the property at issue was no more
'9' Id. at 1212.
19 4 Id. at

1213.
s Id. at 1214.
196
Id. at 1215. For the relevant text of Rule 24, see supra note 58.
197 Id. The "case law" referred to here is more thoroughly discussed below.
198 Id. (citing the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(a) (2000)).
199
Id.
200
Id. (citing Kinscherff v. United States, 586 F.2d 159 (10th Cir. 1978)). In Kinscherff
the plaintiffs believed their "litigable interest" stemmed from New Mexico law entitling
them to use the road as members of the public. Id. They also claimed that their
ownership of land abutting a public highway meant that they had an interest in real
property as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (2000). Id. As stated earlier, the Tenth
Circuit found these arguments unpersuasive and affirmed the district court's dismissal of
the action. Id.
19
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than what could be claimed by other members of the public at large. 20 1 I
other words, because a private party cannot assert an "interest" in a public
road for quiet title purposes and Porfilio frames the issue as a quiet title
action concerning a public road, he argues that SUWA does not satisfy the
plain language of FRCP 24(a)(2) requiring "an interest relating to the
property .

.

. which is the subject of the action."2 02 Porfilio rejected
the
203

majority's "more lenient interpretation of the concept of 'interest."'
Porfilio next addressed the word "transaction" within FRCP
24(a)(2).20 4 He distinguished the current case from others allowing
intervention under Rule 24 because those cases "pertain to governmental
decisions made in the process of administration."2o5Thus, the intervenors
in those cases "usually participated at some stage of the administrative
process, making the word "transaction" in Rule 24(a)(2) the operative
word." 206 SUWA could not successfully argue that it had the "interest"
required to intervene because the subject of this action was not an
administrative transaction.2 0 7
Porfilio further distinguished the interests involved. While the goal
of SUWA is to protect public use of the land "potentially subject to [the]
right of way," the more limited and focused issue pursued by San Juan
County was a determination of whether or not it had legal title to the rightof-way. 208 Finally, Porfilio argued that in addition to the absence of an
interest in the property here, "SUWA has no legally protected interest in
the litigation itself."209 The interest of SUWA is in how the Salt Creek
Canyon is used, whereas the "sigificantly protectable interest" is the
claim to title to the land.2 10

201Id.at
202

1215.

Id. (emphasis added).
203 Id. at 1216.
204 id.
205

Id. (emphasis added).
206 Id. (citing Utah Ass'n of Counties v. Clinton, 255 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2001); Coal. of
Ariz./N.M. Counties for Stable Econ. Growth, 100 F.3d 837 (10th Cir. 1996)).
207

208
20

21o

Id. at 1216-1217.
Id. at 1217.

Id.

Id. (citing Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517 (197 1)).
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V. COMMENT

The Tenth Circuit has now joined other Circuits that hold standing
is not required to intervene under FRCP 24.211 However, this holding
should not be viewed as a measure of intervention ease. In fact, it appears
that many courts and commentators have implicitly assumed this without
further investigation.2 12 Therefore, intervention has not necessarily gotten
easier in the Tenth Circuit post-San Juan Cty., or in the other federal
appellate courts where not requiring standing to intervene has created a
fagade of interventionist accommodation.
The Eighth and D.C. Circuits in South Dakota v. Ubbelohde2 13 and
Fundfor Animals, Inc. v. Norton,214 are prime examples of how circuit
courts applying the "intervention plus" requirement are still able to allow
intervention215 even though their standard is viewed by many as being
antagonistic towards FRCP 24. Thus, because the definition of standing is
fluid,21 6 the standing doctrine is recognized as particularly malleable,2 17
and the Supreme Court appears receptive to the standing issues of
environmental groups in light of Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services,2 18 the effect of "intervention plus" on allowance
of intervention could be negligible. As a result, academic and judicial
attention on the standing-intervention issue has not been given the
standing doctrine the attention it deserves.

Id. at 1203.
See generally Karastelev, supra note 66; Stephanie D. Matheny, Who Can Defend a
FederalRegulation? The Ninth CircuitMisappliedRule 24 By Denying Intervention of
Right in Kootenai Tribe of Idaho v. Veneman, 78 WASH. L. REv. 1067 (2003); and
Stradling & Byers, supra note 66.
213 330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003).
214 322 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
21s Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d at 1023-26; FundforAnimals, 322 F.3d at 737-38.
216
See generally VINING, supra note 32; see also Valley Forge Christian Coll. v.
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982) ("[T]he
concept of Art. III standing has not been defined with complete consistency . . .
211

212

217 id.

218' 528

U.S. 167 (2000).
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A. The Expansion of Standing by the Supreme Court
Friends of the Earth2 19 addressed whether environmental groups
had standing to bring a citizen suit for civil penalties under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA"). 220 The Supreme Court found that the groups did
have sufficient standing, holding that the injury focus during standing
analysis should be on the citizens involved rather than the environment. 22 '
The environmental groups, through their members, demonstrated injury in
fact 222 through affidavits focused on how Laidlaw's continuing practice of
discharging large amounts of mercury into the Tyger River was causing
harm to their "recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests." 223 Unlike
the Court's more restrictive holding in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,2 24
the Court in Friends of the Earth was more accommodating to the legal
argument put forth by the environmental groups. 22 5 Particularly, the Court
noted that there was no demonstrable harm to the environment, yet this is
not where the analysis must end.22 6 The Court found acceptable the
personally suffered aesthetic and economic injuries of the environmental
group members and allowed the case to proceed.22 7 While it is "logical to
conclude that reasonable people would restrict their use of - and pay less
for homes along - waters known to contain a toxic pollutant," 228 the fact
that the individuals here did so was not proven in a "concrete" and
2 19

id.

220 id.

at 173-75.

Id. at 181 ("The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing ... is not injury
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.").
221

222 Id. at

223

180-84.

1 d. at 183-84. Injury was established through affidavits demonstrating that home

values along the river had depreciated, and that individuals had refrained from fishing,
camping, swimming, canoeing, wading, birdwatching, and picnicking in and near the
river due to concern about Laidlaw's substance discharges. Id. at 181-83.
224 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
225
See generally Kristen M. Shults, Comment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services: A Resounding Victoryfor Environmentalists,Its Implications on
FutureJusticiabilityDecisions, and Resolution ofIssues on Remand, 89 GEO. L.J. 1001
(2001).
226 Friendsof the Earth,528 U.S.
at 181-82.
227 Id. at 195.
228 Shults, supra note 227, at
1012.
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"particularized" manner.229 Therefore, the Court significantly broadened
the range, types, and scope of injuries parties can allege to meet the less
demanding standing requirements.
B. PermittingIntervention in "Intervention-plus" Circuits
In the South Dakota v. Ubbelohde water apportionment case, 230 the
Eighth Circuit found that the proposed intervenors "presented sufficient
evidence of a threatened injury to give them standing" and ultimately
allowed them to intervene. 23 1 By focusing on the arguments of an
association representing members with interests in navigation, agriculture,
and water treatment, the court found that a reduction in the flow of the
Missouri River would impair their interests.23 2 Specifically, a water flow
reduction would interrupt navigation, threaten the ability of power plants
to use the water for cooling, and decrease the amount of water available
*
* 233
for community water
supplies.
In addition, the court recognized the "troublesome ... effects that

such a short-term reduction could have on wildlife."2 34 While the opinion
is unclear as to the weight accorded to the wildlife argument, its mere
mention shows an "intervention-plus" circuit being cognizant of
environmental issues and the peripheral matters which accompany them.
Rather than applying a more rigorous test of standing, 235 the court was
receptive to arguments premised on environmental-economic harms that
were not certain to occur, 236 allowing the inference that even though
Friends of the Earth was not cited by the court,2 37 it was aware of its broad
conception of standing.
Fund for Animals is yet another case involving environmental
issues where an "intervention-plus" circuit has allowed intervention in
See Friendsof the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-84.
330 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2003).
231 Id. at 1025.
229
230
232

Id. at 1024.

233

d
id.

234

See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
South Dakota v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1024-25 (8th Cir. 2003).
237 See id. at 1014-33.
235

236

235

Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. 1
spite of the apparent demanding standing requirement. 23 8 In allowing the
Natural Resources Department of Mongolia ("NRD") to intervene,2 the
D.C. Circuit found the NRD's economic argument persuasive. 24 0 To
summarize, the NRD argued that if American hunters were unable to bring
their trophies (argali sheep) home with them due to the sheep being placed
on the endangered list, some hunters would decide not to go to Mongolia,
resulting in decreased revenue for the Mongolian conservation program. 24 1
The court concluded, in a rather conclusory manner, that this potential
economic impairment was sufficient for standing. 242 The court attempted
to characterize the speculative economic argument as "a concrete and
imminent injury," 243 even though it closely resembled the "intention to
travel or view" argument that the Supreme Court found too indefinite, and
thus insufficient for standing purposes in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife. 244
Thus, it appears that the D.C. Circuit applied notions of "concrete and
imminent" in the context of a post-Friends of the Earth standing
atmosphere.
C. Denial of intervention in an apparentlymore receptive circuit
Further supporting the belief that the intervention test applied by a
particular circuit is not determinative of whether intervention will in fact

238

FundforAnimals,322 F.3d 728 (D.C. Cir. 2003). For a thorough explanation of the
case,
see supra notes 123-130 and the accompanying text.
2 39
FundforAnimals, 322 F.3d at 737-38.
240 Id. at 732-34.
The NRD argues that it meets these [standing] requirements because
fees paid by sports hunters are the primary source of funding for its
argali conservation program. If the Fund succeeds in barring American
hunters from bringing their trophies home, some hunters will not travel
to Mongolia to hunt the argali, and the revenues that support the
conservation program will decline.
Id.at 733.
241 Id. at 733.
242
Id. at 732-34 ("The NRD's argument is persuasive").
24 3
Id. at 733.
244 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
562-63 (1992).
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be allowed is United States v. Tennessee.245 Although only requiring an
intervening party to meet the components of FRCP 24(a)(2), the Sixth
Circuit found that the association of nonprofit agencies did not meet the
requirements of FRCP 24(a)(2).2 4 6 In doing so, the court ignored the
"relating to" language from FRCP 24(a)(2). 47 Rather than acknowledge
the economic interest connection to the federal government's suit that
would require the State of Tennessee to operate its mental health system
constitutionally and in accordance with federal statute, the court
apparently decided that it would not apply its "expansive notion of the
interest" precedent. 248 In failing to see how a violation of federal law may
affect the level of funding provided by the State to the association
members, the court applied a strict notion of FRCP 24(a)(2) that its past
case law could not support.249 United States v. Tennessee demonstrates
how easily a court may deny intervention through a more stringent
application of FRCP 24(a)(2), notwithstanding the court's own precedent.

United States v. Tenn., 260 F.3d 587 (6th Cir. 2001). For a more thorough description
of the case see supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
246Id. at 596.
247 Id. at 595-96 (emphasis added).
248Id. at 595.
249
1d. at 595-96. In the court's discussion of the economic interest argument, it did not
cite any past case law to support its decision. Id.
245
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VI. CONCLUSION
While the significance of San Juan County is derived in large part
due to its provision of precedent on the standing-intervention issue for the
Tenth Circuit, a closer analysis of the case and case law cited by the court
demonstrates the limited predictive value that resolving the standingintervention issue provides to future litigants. The temptation in
jurisdictions where courts have directly ruled on the standing-intervention
question will be to view the issue as completely resolved for future parties.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. Because the components of standing
and intervention are based largely on discretionary judgments of a specific
court considering a party's interest in the action, a thorough review of a
jurisdiction's past precedent on both intervention and standing is essential
to approximate a party's intervention chances.
ERIC S. OELRICH
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